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Secure communication plays a crucial role in the Internet Age. Quantum mechanics may revo-
lutionise cryptography as we know it today. In this Review Article, we introduce the motivation
and the current state of the art of research in quantum cryptography. In particular, we discuss
the present security model together with its assumptions, strengths and weaknesses. After a brief
introduction to recent experimental progress and challenges, we survey the latest developments in
quantum hacking and counter-measures against it.
With the rise of the Internet, the importance of cryptog-
raphy is growing every day. Each time we make an on-line
purchase with our credit cards, or we conduct financial
transactions using Internet banking, we should be con-
cerned with secure communication. Unfortunately, the
security of conventional cryptography is often based on
computational assumptions. For instance, the security
of the RSA scheme [1], the most widely used public-key
encryption scheme, is based on the presumed hardness
of factoring. Consequently, conventional cryptography
is vulnerable to unanticipated advances in hardware and
algorithms, as well as to quantum code-breaking such as
Shor’s efficient algorithm [2] for factoring. Government
and trade secrets are kept for decades. An eavesdropper,
Eve, may simply save communications sent in 2014 and
wait for technological advances. If she is able to factorise
large integers in say 2100, she could retroactively break
the security of data sent in 2014.
In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD),
the best-known application of quantum cryptography,
promises to achieve the Holy Grail of cryptography—
unconditional security in communication. By uncondi-
tional security or, more precisely, -security, as it will
be explained shortly (see section discussing the security
model of QKD), Eve is not restricted by computational
assumptions but she is only limited by the laws of physics.
QKD is a remarkable solution to long-term security since,
in principle, it offers security for eternity. Unlike conven-
tional cryptography, which allows Eve to store a classical
transcript of communications, in QKD, once a quantum
transmission is done, there is no classical transcript for
Eve to store. See Box 1 for background information on
secure communication and QKD.
Box 1 | Secure communication and QKD.
Secure Communication: Suppose a sender, Alice, would like to send a secret message to a receiver, Bob, through
an open communication channel. Encryption is needed. If they share a common string of secret bits, called a key,
Alice can use her key to transform a plain-text into a cipher-text, which is unintelligible to Eve. In contrast, Bob,
with his key, can decrypt the cipher-text and recover the plain-text. In cryptography, the security of a crypto-system
should rely solely on the secrecy of the key. The question is: how to distribute a key securely? In conventional
cryptography, this is often done by trusted couriers. Unfortunately, in classical physics, couriers may be brided or
compromised without the users noticing it. This motivates the development of quantum key distribution (QKD).
Quantum Key Distribution: The best-known QKD protocol (BB84) was published by Bennett and Brassard in
1984 [3]. Alice sends Bob a sequence of photons prepared in different polarisation states, which are chosen at random
from two conjugate bases. For each photon, Bob selects randomly one of the two conjugate bases and performs a
measurement. He records the outcome of his measurement and the basis choice. Through an authenticated channel,
Alice and Bob broadcast their measurement bases. They discard all polarisation data sent and received in different
bases and use the remaining data to generate a sifted key. To test for tampering they compute the quantum bit error
rate (QBER) of a randomly selected subset of data and verify that the QBER is below a certain threshold value. By
applying classical post-processing protocols such as error correction and privacy amplification, they generate a secure
key. This key can be used to make the communication unconditionally secure by using a one-time-pad protocol [4].
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2One-time-pad protocol: The message is represented by a binary string. The key is also a binary string of the
same length as the message. For encryption, a bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR) is performed between the corresponding
bits of the message and the key to generate a cipher-text. Decryption is done by performing a bitwise XOR between
the corresponding bits of the cipher-text and the key. For one-time-pad to be secure, the key should not be re-used.
Achievements and future goals in QKD. On the
theory side, a landmark accomplishment has been rig-
orous security proofs of QKD protocols. Recently, a
“composable” definition [5, 6] of the security of QKD
has been obtained. Stable QKD over long distances (of
the order of 100km) has been achieved in both fibres
and free-space [7, 8]. Commercial QKD systems are cur-
rently available in the market. Field test demonstrations
of QKD networks have been done [9–16]. High detec-
tion efficiency single-photon detectors at telecom wave-
lengths have been developed [17–20]. In short, QKD
is already mature enough for real-life applications. As
an illustration, Fig. 1 shows the tremendous progress
that has been made in free-space QKD over the last two
decades. It compares the first lab demonstration per-
formed in 1992 [21] with two recent QKD implementa-
tions that connect, respectively, two Canary Islands [8]
and a ground station with a hot-air balloon [22].
And, what researchers are aiming to do now? As will
be discussed in the rest of the paper, to guarantee un-
conditional security in actual QKD implementations, re-
searchers are working hard to bridge the gap between
theory and practice. Also, the development of high-speed
QKD systems, together with the ability of multiplexing
strong classical signals with weak quantum signals in the
same optical fibre, for example, via wavelength division
multiplexing (WDM), are major research challenges of
the field. Moreover, researchers are studying QKD net-
work set-ups with both trusted and untrusted nodes. The
feasibility of ground to satellite QKD has also attracted
a lot of research attention [22, 23].
Security model of QKD
Intuitively speaking, the security of QKD is measured
with respect to a perfect key distribution scheme where
Alice and Bob share a true random secret key. More
precisely, we say that a QKD system is -secure if and
only if the probability distribution of an outcome of any
measurement performed on the QKD scheme and the re-
sulting key deviates at most  from the one of the perfect
key distribution protocol and the perfect key [5, 6, 24].
A typical value for  is 10−10. However, in principle Al-
ice and Bob could select  as small as they want, just by
applying enough privacy amplification.
Of course, since a secret key is a resource for other
cryptographic protocols (e.g., the one-time-pad method),
it is not enough to consider the security of the QKD
protocol alone. Instead, one has to evaluate the security
of the generated key when it is employed in a crypto-
system. This notion is known as “composable” security.
Fortunately, QKD is composably secure [5, 6, 24]. That
is, if we have a set of cryptographic protocols (which may
include QKD), each of them having a security parameter
i, as part of a certain cryptographic scheme, then the
security of the whole system is given by
∑
i i.
Progress in security proofs. Once we have presented
the security definition of QKD, next we discuss the se-
curity of a particular QKD implementation: the BB84
scheme [3]. In its original theoretical proposal, Alice
sends Bob single-photon states. However, as practical
and efficient single-photon sources are yet to be realised,
most implementations of the BB84 protocol are based
on phase-randomised weak coherent state pulses (WCPs)
with a typical average photon number of 0.1 or higher.
These states can be easily prepared using standard semi-
conductor lasers and calibrated attenuators. The main
drawback of these systems, however, arises from the fact
that some signals may contain more than one photon pre-
pared in the same quantum state. If Eve performs, for
instance, the so-called Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS)
attack [25] on the multi-photon pulses, she could obtain
full information about the part of the key generated with
them without causing any noticeable disturbance. That
is, in BB84 only the single-photon states sent by Alice
and detected by Bob can provide a secure key. For-
tunately, to distill a key from these single-photon con-
tributions it is enough if Alice and Bob can estimate a
lower bound for the total number of such events, i.e., they
do not need to identify which particular detected pulses
originate from single-photon emissions [26]. In the case
of the BB84 scheme, this estimation procedure must as-
sume the worst case scenario where Eve blocks as many
single-photon pulses as possible. As a result, it turns out
that its key generation rate scales as η2, where η denotes
the transmittance of the quantum channel. This quantity
has the form η = 10−
αd
10 , where α is the loss coefficient
of the channel measured in dB/km (α ≈ 0.2 dB/km for
standard commercial fibres) and d is the covered distance
measured in km.
In reality, however, Eve may not be monitoring the
quantum channel and performing a PNS attack. To im-
prove the achievable secret key rate in general, therefore,
is necessary to estimate more precisely the amount of
single-photon pulses detected by Bob. This can be done
using the so-called decoy-state method [27–36], which can
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FIG. 1. | Progress in free-space QKD implementations. a, First free-space demonstration of QKD [21] realised two
decades ago over a distance of 32cm. The system uses a light emitting diode (LED) in combination with Pockels Cells to
prepare and measure the different signal states. b, Entanglement-based QKD setup connecting the Canary Islands of La Palma
and Tenerife [8]. The length of the optical link is 144km. c, Schematic diagram of a decoy-state BB84 QKD experiment
between ground and a hot-air balloon [22]. This demonstration can be seen as a first step towards QKD between ground and
Low Earth Orbit Satellites. In the figure: (HWP) half-wave plate, (MON) monitor window, (MIR) mirror, (ATT) attenuator,
(DM) dichroic mirror, (532LD) 532nm laser, (FSM) fast steering mirror, (671LD) 671nm laser, (532D) 532nm detector, and
(IF) interference filter. Figures from: a, Ref. [21]; b, Ref. [8]; and c, Ref. [22].
basically reach the performance of single-photon sources,
where the key generation rate scales linearly with η. The
procedure is as follows. Instead of sending signals of equal
intensity, Alice chooses first the intensity for each sig-
nal at random from a set of prescribed values. States
sent in one particular intensity are called signal states,
whereas the states sent with other intensities are called
decoy-states. Once Bob has detected all the signals, Al-
ice broadcasts the intensity used for each pulse. A crucial
assumption here is that all other possible degrees of free-
dom of the signals (apart from the intensity) are equal
for all of them. This way, even if Eve knows the total
number of photons contained in a given pulse, her deci-
sion on whether or not send that signal to Bob cannot
depend on its intensity. That is, Eve’s decision is based
on what is known a priori. Consequently, the probability
of having a detection event given that Alice sent a single-
photon pulse is the same for the signal and decoy pulses.
As a result, Alice and Bob can estimate the fraction of
detected events that arise from single-photons more pre-
cisely. This technique is rather general and also very
useful for other quantum cryptographic protocols [37].
Experimental implementations
Experimental realisations of QKD have made a huge
progress in the last two decades. In practice, the sig-
nal transmission can be done through free-space (using
a wavelength around 800nm) or through optical fibres
(using the second or third telecom windows, i.e., wave-
lengths around 1310nm and 1550nm, respectively). Also,
current set-ups use different degrees of freedom to encode
the relevant information into the optical pulses. As al-
ready introduced, an obvious choice for this is to employ
the polarisation state of the photons. This technique, so-
called polarisation coding, is mostly used in free-space
QKD links. For optical fibre transmission, however, one
usually selects other coding options such as, for exam-
ple, phase-coding, time-bin coding or frequency coding.
This is so because polarisation in standard fibres is more
susceptible to disturbances due to birefringence and en-
vironmental effects.
Fig. 2a shows conceptually how simple is the basic set-
up for the decoy-state BB84 protocol when Alice and Bob
use polarisation coding. The expected secret key rate
(per pulse) as a function of the distance is illustrated in
Fig. 2b. The cut-off point where the secret key rate drops
to zero depends on the parameters of the system (spe-
cially, on the channel transmission and on the efficiency
and dark count rate of Bob’s detectors), and is typically
around 150-200km. For comparison, as shown in the Fig-
ure, (the corresponding lower bound on) the secret key
rate for the standard BB84 protocol without decoy-states
is much lower. Fig. 2c shows a photo of a fibre-coupled
modularly-integrated decoy-state BB84 transmitter de-
veloped by Los Alamos group [38]; it is similar in size to
an electro-optic modulator.
Alice and Bob may enlarge further the covered dis-
tance by using entanglement-based QKD protocols [39–
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FIG. 2. | Experimental QKD. a, Schematic diagram of the decoy-state BB84 protocol [27–36] based on polarisation coding.
Four lasers are used to prepare the polarisations needed in BB84. Decoy-states are generated with an intensity modulator (AM).
On Bob’s side, a 50 : 50 beam-splitter (BS) is used to passively ensure a random measurement basis choice. Active receivers are
also common. In the figure: (PM) phase modulator, (M) mirror, (F) optical filter, (I) optical isolator, (R) polarisation rotator,
and (PBS) polarising beam-splitter. b, Lower bound on the secret key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic scale for a BB84 set-up
with two decoys (green line) [30]. In the short distance regime, the key rate scales linearly with the transmittance, η. (Red line)
standard BB84 protocol without decoy-states [3, 26]; its key rate scales as η2. c, Photo of a fibre-coupled modularly-integrated
decoy-state BB84 transmitter based on polarisation coding [38]; it produces decoy-state BB84 signals at a repetition rate of 10
MHz. d, Performance of the SwissQuantum network [11]. This network run for more than one and a half years in the Geneva
metropolitan area, Switzerland. The data shown in the figure corresponds to a QKD link of 14.4km; it highlights how stable
current QKD set-ups are. Figures from: c, Ref. [38]; and d, Ref. [11].
42], as these schemes can tolerate higher losses (up to
about 70 dB) than WCP-based protocols. For instance,
they could employ a parametric down-conversion source
to generate polarisation entangled photons that are dis-
tributed between them. This source could be even con-
trolled by Eve, and it can be placed in the middle be-
tween the legitimate users. On the receiving side, both
Alice and Bob measure the signals received using, for ex-
ample, a BB84 receiver like the one shown in Fig. 2a.
Two drawbacks of this approach are, however, that the
systems are more involved than those based on WCPs,
and their secret key rate is usually lower in the low loss
regime. Alternatively to polarisation coding, one can use
as well, for instance, energy-time entangled photon pairs.
For shorter distances (say below 100km), there are
other solutions that are simpler to implement experimen-
tally. These are the so-called distributed-phase-reference
QKD protocols [43–45]. They differ from standard QKD
schemes in that now Alice encodes the information co-
herently between adjacent pulses, rather than in indi-
vidual pulses. This approach includes the differential-
phase-shift (DPS) [43, 44] and the coherent-one-way
(COW) [45] protocols. In the former, Alice prepares a
train of WCPs of equal intensity and modulates their
phases. On the receiving side, Bob uses a one-bit de-
lay Mach-Zehnder interferometer, followed by two single-
photon detectors, to measure the incoming pulses. Sim-
ilarly, in the COW protocol all pulses share a common
phase but now Alice varies their intensities.
An important issue in any QKD implementation is
its reliability and robustness in a real life environment.
Fig. 2d shows the performance (as a function of time) of
a QKD link from the SwissQuantum network installed
in Geneva, Switzerland [11]. It demonstrates the high
stability of current QKD systems.
The protocols described above belong to the so-
called discrete-variable QKD schemes. Another inter-
esting option is to use continuous-variable systems (CV-
QKD) [46–48]. The key feature of this solution is that
now the detection device consists of (homodyne or het-
erodyne) measurements of the light-field quadratures.
Consequently, these protocols can be implemented with
standard telecom components and do not require single-
photon detectors, which makes them also very suitable
5for experimental realisations.
QKD components and data-processing. For the op-
tical layer of a QKD system, the following components
are typically needed:
1. Light sources: Attenuated laser pulses can be used
as the signal source in QKD. It is standard to model the
signal as a WCP. By applying a global phase randomisa-
tion, the state becomes a classical mixture of Fock states
(i.e., states of different photon numbers) with Poissonian
distribution.
2. Single-photon detectors: Single-photon detection is
the ultimate limit of the detection of light. It is important
not only in QKD applications, but also in sensitive mea-
surements in astronomy and bio-medical physics. Tra-
ditionally, two different types of detectors—Silicon de-
tectors and InGaAs detectors—have been widely used in
QKD. Silicon detectors are broadly employed for visible
wavelengths (e.g., 800nm) and in free-space implemen-
tations. They have rather high detection efficiency of
around 50%. InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are
often used in telecom wavelengths and in fibre optical
communication. Previously, they suffered from low de-
tection efficiency of around 15%. Another drawback of
InGaAs APDs was that they had a rather long dead-
time after a detection event, which severely limited the
detection repetition rate to only a few MHz. In the last
few years, however, new detector technologies have been
developed for QKD applications. This includes, for ex-
ample: self-differencing APDs [49, 50], the sine wave
gating technique [51–53], a hybrid approach combining
these last two methods [54], as well as superconducting
nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) [17], which
all can operate at GHz detection repetition rate. Also,
the detection efficiency of InGaAs APDs has been im-
proved to about 50% at 1310nm [20], and new types of
SNSPDs with a very high detection efficiency of around
93% have been developed [17–19]. The main drawback
of these novel SNSPDs [17–19], however, is their oper-
ating temperature, which is at the moment of the order
of 0.1 K. The dark count rate of these high efficiency
SNSPDs [17–19], of the order of 100 Hz, can be substan-
tially improved by better rejection of ambient photons
using optical band-pass filters at the input port of the
SNSPDs [55].
3. Standard linear optical components: polarising
beam-splitters, beam-splitters, amplitude modulators
and phase modulators are widely used in QKD appli-
cations.
4. Random number generators: Random num-
bers are needed for basis choice, bit value choice,
phase-randomisation, intensity choice in the decoy-state
method as well as for data post-processing. High-speed
random number generation is a key bottleneck in current
QKD. Fortunately, there have been a lot of research ac-
tivities in the subject. Quantum mechanics offers true
randomness from the laws of physics [56]. A simple way
to build a quantum random number generator (QRNG) is
to send a WCP through a 50 : 50 beam-splitter and put
two single-photon detectors on the two outgoing arms.
The actual bit value (0 or 1) generated depends on which
detector detects a photon. Other methods [57–59] to de-
sign QRNGs such as using phase noise [60] also exist.
5. Classical post-processing techniques: Processes such
as post-selection of data (typically called sifting), error
correction and privacy amplification are used to correct
errors in the quantum transmission and to remove any
residual information that Eve might have on the raw
key. The final result is a key shared by Alice and Bob
that Eve almost surely has absolutely no information
about. A bottleneck in high-speed QKD is the computa-
tional complexity of classical post-processing protocols,
together with the processing of huge raw data in a very
short time. Fortunately, progresses have been made for
algorithm speed-up using hardware-based (e.g., FPGA)
solutions [7].
6. Authenticated channel: For QKD to work, besides
a quantum channel, Alice and Bob need to share an au-
thenticated classical channel. Fortunately, only a rather
short authentication key is needed for this. Such an au-
thentication key may be provided in the initial shipment
of the QKD system through a temper-resistant device.
Once a QKD session has succeeded, one can refurbish
the authentication key from the key generated by QKD.
In this sense, QKD is a key growing protocol.
If initially there is no shared key between Alice and
Bob, they may also use a classical solution for authentica-
tion based on computational assumptions via a certifying
authority, which is a standard protocol in the Internet.
Provided that such an authentication scheme is unbroken
for a short period of time during the first QKD session,
the first QKD session will be secure and will generate the
subsequent authentication keys.
Industrial/application perspectives. The field of
QKD attracts both fundamental research and industrial
interests. As mentioned above, there are already com-
mercial products that offer encryption solutions based
on this technology. Also, QKD networks have been re-
cently deployed in USA [9], Austria [10], Switzerland [11],
China [12–14] and Japan [15]. As an illustration, Fig. 3a
shows the current structure of the Tokyo QKD net-
work [15]. It uses an architecture based on trusted nodes,
which are separated by distances that range between 1km
to 90km. The network consists of three main layers: a
QKD layer, a key management layer, and an application
layer. In the former, QKD systems that connect neigh-
bouring nodes generate secret key material continuously,
i.e., without any maintenance [7]. This key, of the order
of 300 Kbps when the link loss is around 14.5 dB [15], is
forwarded to a key management agent placed in the key
management layer. This agent monitors the key genera-
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FIG. 3. | QKD networks. a, Schematic representation of the layer structure of the Tokyo QKD network [15], which is based
on a trusted node architecture. From the viewpoint of the users, the QKD layer and the key management layer can be treated
as a black box that supplies them a secure key. On the application layer, they can enjoy applications such as secure video
meetings and secure communication using smart phones. Different QKD networks have been implemented as well in other
countries; see, for instance, [9–14]. b, (Upper subfigure) Downstream versus upstream passive quantum access network. In the
upstream approach [16], the single-photon detectors are located only at the network node. This may reduce the costs of the
network and allow a more efficient use of its detectors’ bandwidth. (Lower subfigure) Estimated secret key rate per user for an
upstream solution as a function of the distance and the number of active users in the network for various network capacities.
Figures from: a, adapted from Ref. [15]; and b, Ref. [16].
tion rate and the amount of stored key. Secure commu-
nication is possible between any nodes in the network by
relaying on the secret key that is controlled by command
of the key management server. From the viewpoint of the
users, the QKD layer and the key management layer can
be treated as a black box that supplies them a secure
key. Such network could be employed, for instance, to
provide secure communications with smart phones. Any
time a user needs a fresh secret key to protect his com-
munication over the phone, he could connect to the QKD
network and store in his device the key obtained for later
use [15]. Also, new architectures for QKD networks have
been recently proposed by the Toshiba group and by Los
Alamos group. Fig. 3b compares the upstream passive
quantum access network implemented by Toshiba [16]
with a downstream approach, whereas Fig. 2c is the com-
pact transmitter prepared by Los Alamos group [38].
Lately, QKD systems have been used in the Swiss na-
tional elections to protect the line that transmitted the
ballots to the counting station. Also, they have secured a
communication link at the 2010 FIFA World Cup compe-
tition in Durban, South Africa. Other potential applica-
tions of QKD include, for example, offsite backup, enter-
prise private networks, critical infrastructure protection,
backbone protection and high security access networks.
Technological challenges. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, researchers are working on designing and
building high-speed QKD systems [61] and the ability
of multiplexing strong classical signals with weak quan-
tum signals in the same optical fibre [62–64]. Theorists
are developing sophisticated techniques to increase the
key generation rate (which is currently limited to about
1 Mbps [65–69]) and deal properly with various device
imperfections of QKD implementations. To extend the
distance of QKD, the ideas of both trusted and untrusted
relay nodes have been studied. There has also been much
interest in the concept of ground to satellite QKD. We
will survey some of these recent efforts here.
Multiplexing techniques: Very recently, a field-test of
a QKD system that multiplexes two quantum channels
in the third telecom window using WDM has been per-
formed [7]. The result is a very stable key generation
rate from both channels over 30 days of operation with-
out maintenance. This promising work confirms the pos-
sibility of using WDM techniques in QKD in order to
increase its secure bit rate. Importantly, alternative re-
sults have also shown that quantum signals can be com-
bined as well with strong conventional telecom traffics
in the same fibre [62–64], thus showing the feasibility
7of integrating QKD into existing fibre optical networks.
In [63], for example, a QKD channel is located at 1310nm,
while classical channels use the third telecom window. A
slight drawback of this solution, however, is the higher
transmission loss of the fibre at 1310nm, which limits
the achievable QKD rate and distance. Alternatively,
in [62, 64] both the quantum and classical channels use
wavelengths around 1550nm. In so doing, [62] achieves,
for instance, a secure key rate exceeding 1 Mbps over
35km of fibre when the intensity of the classical sig-
nals is around −18.6 dBm. Remarkably, the same re-
search group has shown that QKD is also possible in a
high data laser power environment of around 0 dBm [64].
In this case, the secret key rate is of the order of hun-
dreds of Kbps over 25km of fibre. On the other hand, it
turns out that CV-QKD systems can also be quite robust
against noise from strong telecom traffics due to multi-
plexing [70, 71]. This is so because the local oscillator
serves as a “mode selector” [72] to suppress the noise.
Development of the theory: The key generation rate
can also be increased by developing better security analy-
sis. A practical security proof must take into account the
statistical fluctuations due to the finite data size. There-
fore, the development of more sophisticated techniques
for such analysis can result in higher key rates [24, 73, 74].
Also, one could include modifications in the protocol such
as, for instance, the use of a biased basis choice.
Extending the QKD coverage: Up to this point, we
have discussed different alternatives to integrate QKD
into existing fibre optical networks and to improve the
key rate of the system. Another important parameter is
the covered distance, which is typically limited to about
350km (if one uses entanglement-based schemes). Of
course, this upper limit could be improved if one em-
ploys ultra-low loss fibres [45]. In general, one simple
solution to overcome this distance limitation is to use
trusted nodes, just like in the QKD networks presented
previously. Note, however, that to achieve secure com-
munication over long distances (say over 10, 000km) one
needs many trusted nodes. Another possible solution
is to use satellites, which could be employed both as
trusted or untrusted nodes. In the former case, one can
see the satellite as a trusted courier that can perform
QKD as well as travel very fast around a certain orbit.
This way, one could perform in the future QKD over
the globe. Indeed, a preliminary QKD experiment be-
tween ground and a hot-air balloon has been performed
recently [22]; see also [23]. This demonstration is illus-
trated in Fig. 1c. It can be seen as a first step towards
QKD between ground and Low Earth Orbit Satellites.
Here, the development of accurate pointing techniques
is one of the key technologies. Satellites could also be
employed to build a QKD network with untrusted nodes
by using, for example, measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QKD [75] (which will be discussed later in the
subsection on “Counter-measures”), where the parties on
the ground send quantum signals to the satellites that
perform a joint measurement on the incoming signals.
Also, one could place the source of an entanglement-
based QKD protocol on a satellite and the receivers in
the ground.
Quantum hacking and counter-measures
QKD can be proved secure in theory. However, are exper-
imental implementations of QKD also secure? Security
proofs rely on assumptions. Some of them are quite nat-
ural, such as, for instance, the validity of quantum me-
chanics. Other assumptions, however, are more severe,
such as, for example, that Alice and Bob have an accurate
and complete description of their physical apparatuses.
Unfortunately, real-life realisations of QKD often present
imperfections and rarely conform to the theoretical mod-
els used to prove their security. As a result, there is a
gap between the theory and the practice of QKD. Even
though in principle QKD has been proven to be secure,
practical systems may contain security loopholes, or so-
called side-channels, which might be exploited by Eve to
learn the distributed key without being detected.
Indeed, this has been the case in recent attacks against
certain commercial and research QKD set-ups [76–91],
where Eve employed some imperfections in the devices,
specially in the single-photon detectors, to hack the sys-
tem. But one should not be overly alarmed by this fact
at this stage, as current realisations of QKD are still in
the battle-testing phase. Every time a new commercial
cryptographic scheme is introduced, it is rather common
for its first versions to contain some security flaws in the
implementation. During the battle-testing period, these
flaws are typically found and fixed. As a result, the sys-
tems become more and more secure. Also, it should
be remarked that QKD is often combined with classi-
cal cryptography; for instance, by performing a bitwise
XOR operation between a classical key and a key ob-
tained with QKD. In this sense, QKD can only improve
the final security of the whole system, but not reduce it.
Quantum hacking. What kind of imperfections can
Eve exploit to hack a QKD system? In principle, QKD
only secures the communication channel, so Eve may try
to attack both the sources (i.e., the preparation stage of
the quantum signals) and the measurement device. A list
of various existing attacks on QKD set-ups can be found
in Table I. The source is typically less likely to be a prob-
lem. This is so because Alice can prepare her quantum
signals (e.g., the polarisation state of phase-randomised
WCPs) in a fully protected environment outside the in-
fluence of the eavesdropper. This can be achieved, for
instance, using optical isolators. Also, Alice can exper-
imentally verify the quantum states emitted. For this,
she can employ, for example, random sampling tech-
niques. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that Alice
can characterise her source. Fortunately, in this situa-
8Efficiency of Det. 0
Efficiency of Det. 1
Time Shift (ps)
-350         -150           5 0           250           450          650   
0
0.015
0.03
0.045
0.06
D
et
ec
to
r E
ff
ic
ie
nc
y
a
c
SM fibre
 290 m
Bob
Alice
PBS
BS
PA
clicks
LD
FPC
BBO FPC
SPDC
404 nm 808
 nm
808 nm
Eve
HW
P
PB
S
Image © 2009 DigitalGlobe
TS PC
HW
P
PBS
PB
S
BS
PA
Pth/2
Pth
0
clicks
Pth/2
TS PC
TS
FSGFPCLD
PC
PBS
BS
PA
clicks
↕2Pth↕
↕
↕
↕
HW
P
PB
S
Eve
Alice FSG. Bob
Identical bases & bit values
Classical post-processing
Listen
Bob′
(a)
(b)
Identical bases 
   & bit values
Classical post-processing
Listen
b
c
FIG. 4. | Examples of quantum hacking. a, Experimentally measured detection efficiency mismatch between two detectors
from a commercial QKD system versus time shifts [77]. This could be exploited by Eve to perform a time-shift attack [76],
i.e., she could shift the arrival time of each signal such that one detector has a much higher detection efficiency than the other.
b, Working principle of the detector blinding attack [81]. By shining bright light into the detectors, Eve can make them leave
the Geiger mode operation (used in QKD) and enter into the linear mode operation. In so doing, she can control which detector
produces a “click” each given time and learn the entire secret key without being detected. c, Full-field implementation of a
detector blinding attack on a running entanglement-based QKD set-up [84]. Figures from: a, Ref. [77]; b, Ref. [81], and c,
Ref. [84].
Attack Target component Tested system
Time-shift [76–79] Detector Commercial system
Time-information [80] Detector Research system
Detector-control [81–83] Detector Commercial system
Detector-control [84] Detector Research system
Detector dead-time [85] Detector Research system
Channel calibration [86] Detector Commercial system
Phase-remapping [87] Phase modulator Commercial system
Faraday-mirror [88] Faraday mirror Theory
Wavelength [89] Beam-splitter Theory
Phase information [90] Source Research system
Device calibration [91] Local oscillator Research system
TABLE I. Summary of various quantum hacking attacks
against certain commercial and research QKD set-ups.
tion, it is usually relatively easy to incorporate imperfec-
tions of Alice’s state preparation process in the security
proof [26, 92].
The problem with the measurement device of Bob is
more subtle, as Eve is allowed to send in any signal she
desires and, therefore, it is harder to protect Bob’s set-
up against any possible attack. Indeed, most quantum
hacking strategies are directed at Bob’s single-photon de-
tectors [76–86], which can be regarded as the Achilles’
heel of QKD. For instance, Eve could exploit their de-
tection efficiency mismatch [76–79]. This is illustrated
in Fig. 4a. However, the most important hacking at-
tack so far against the detectors of the system is the
so-called detector blinding attack [81]. Here, Eve shines
bright light into the detectors to make them enter into
the so-called linear mode operation, where they are not
longer sensitive to single-photon pulses but only to strong
light pulses [81]. As a consequence, Eve can effectively
fully control which detector produces a “click” each given
time, just by sending Bob additional bright pulses. This
way, Eve can learn the secret key completely. This is
shown in Figs. 4b and 4c [84]. Other possible imperfec-
tions that could be exploited include, for instance, the
dead-time of the detectors [85].
9Counter-measures. A natural solution to recover secu-
rity in QKD implementations would be to develop math-
ematical models that perfectly match the behaviour of
all QKD components and systems, and then incorpo-
rate this information into a new security proof. Unfor-
tunately, while this is plausible in theory, it is hard to
realise in practice (if not impossible), as QKD compo-
nents are complex devices. Currently, there are three
main alternative approaches.
The first one is to use security patches. Fortunately,
every time a security loophole is found, usually it is al-
ways quite easy to obtain a suitable counter-measure [93–
96]. In so doing, one can guarantee security against
known attacks. But note that the system might be de-
feated by hacking advances. This scenario is similar
to most classical cryptographic techniques, as here one
abandons the provable security model of QKD.
The second approach is called device-independent (DI)
QKD [97–100]. See Fig. 5a. Here, Alice and Bob treat
their devices as two “black boxes”. That is, they do not
need to fully characterise their different elements. The
security of DI-QKD relies on the violation of a Bell in-
equality, which certifies the presence of quantum correla-
tions. Unfortunately, due to the detection efficiency loop-
hole (which requires a detection efficiency around 80% or
higher), a loophole-free Bell test is still unavailable. In-
deed, the high decoupling and channel loss, together with
the limited detection efficiency of current single-photon
detectors, renders DI-QKD highly impractical with cur-
rent technology. Even if Alice and Bob try to compen-
sate the channel loss by including a fair-sampling device,
such as a qubit amplifier [101, 102] or a quantum non-
demolition measurement of the number of photons in a
pulse, the resulting secret key rate of DI-QKD at practi-
cal distances is unfortunately very limited (e.g., of order
10−10 bits per pulse) [101, 102]. Of course, technology is
improving and DI-QKD might still prove viable in say 10
or 15 years. In summary, the first approach to counter
the quantum hacking problem is ad hoc whereas DI-QKD
is impractical nowadays.
The third approach is MDI-QKD [75], which currently
appears to be a possibly viable solution to the quan-
tum hacking problem. See Figs. 5b and 5c. The main
advantage of this approach is that it allows Alice and
Bob to perform QKD with untrusted measurement de-
vices, which can be even manufactured by Eve. In other
words, MDI-QKD removes completely the weakest part
of a QKD realisation, and offers an avenue to bridge the
gap between theory and practice. The security of MDI-
QKD is based on the idea of time reversal [107, 108].
Alice and Bob prepare quantum signals and send them
to an untrusted relay, Charles/Eve, who is supposed to
perform a Bell-state measurement on the signals received.
The honesty of Charles can be verified by comparing a
subset of the transmitted data. Most importantly, MDI-
QKD can be implemented with standard optical com-
ponents with low detection efficiency and highly lossy
channels. The key rate of MDI-QKD is many orders of
magnitude higher than that of DI-QKD and the experi-
mental feasibility of MDI-QKD has been already demon-
strated both in laboratories and via field-tests [103–106].
The key assumption in MDI-QKD is that Alice and Bob
trust their sources. As noted earlier, this may not be an
unreasonable assumption because, when compared with
single-photon detectors that receive unknown quantum
states prepared by Eve, Alice and Bob have a much
better chance to monitor their own preparation process
carefully within their own laboratories. In fact, as men-
tioned before, source flaws can be taken care off in se-
curity proofs [26, 92]. A slight drawback of MDI-QKD
is, however, its relatively low secret key rate when com-
pared to the decoy-state BB84 protocol. This is so be-
cause MDI-QKD requires two-fold coincidence detector
events which are suppressed due to the low detection ef-
ficiency of standard InGaAs single-photon detectors. If
one uses SNSPDs with 93% detection efficiency as the
ones described previously, then such a disadvantage will
disappear. Also, note that MDI-QKD could be used to
build a QKD network with untrusted nodes, which would
be desirable from a security standpoint.
Outlook
To further extend the distance of secure quantum com-
munication, there have been a lot of research activities
in “quantum repeaters” [109], which allow entanglement
to be swapped and distilled between different entangled
pairs of photons.
If MDI-QKD is widely deployed in the future, then the
frontier of quantum hacking will shift towards attacking
the source (rather than the detectors). It will become
important to re-examine the various security assumptions
used there (e.g., single-mode assumption, perfect global
phase randomisation and no side-channels). The eternal
welfare between the code-breakers and code-makers will
continue.
Owing to space limit, this article has focused on QKD.
It should be noted that other applications of quan-
tum cryptography such as quantum secret sharing, blind
quantum computing and quantum coin flipping have also
been proposed, whereas other protocols such as quantum
bit commitment has been shown to be impossible without
additional assumptions.
To conclude, we highlight the deep connections of
quantum cryptography with other areas of physics as well
as mathematics and technology. For instance, the loop-
holes in the security of practical QKD systems are closely
related to the loopholes in the testing of Bell’s inequali-
ties in the foundations of quantum mechanics. Quantum
cryptography is also closely related to mathematics, in-
formation theory and statistics as it widely uses concepts
in those subjects. Furthermore, quantum cryptography
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FIG. 5. | Examples of counter-measures against quantum hacking. a, Schematic diagram of device-independent (DI)
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provides much impetus to technological developments in
single-photon detectors, which can also be used to im-
prove quantum metrology and sensing and contribute to
the ultimate goal of the construction of large-scale quan-
tum computers.
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